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Ahead of the general election in April and May 2019, Indian political parties 
are using social media aggressively to propagate their ideology, mobilise 
public opinion, set policy agendas, and discredit detractors. Since the 2014 
general election, India’s two major political parties – the Bharatiya Janata 
Party, which currently leads the coalition government, and the Indian Na-
tional Congress, the main opposition party – have invested heavily in digital 
political campaigning.
 • Political parties use social media to directly and continuously engage with 
 voters. More so than traditional media, social media can amplify and mobilise 
political opinions and reach out to even the remotest geographical areas. 
 • Social media’s unique value is that it allows for both mass messaging and 
 micro-targeting. Bolstered by grass-roots campaigning, it is immensely power-
ful in moulding public opinion both in India and beyond.
 • While facilitating civic engagement for a more participatory democracy, social 
media is also misused for propaganda, hate speech, and disinformation cam-
paigns, which can undermine the pluralistic foundations of Indian democracy. 
Policy Implications
Today, successful political campaigns rest on the innovative employment of so­
cial media, a trend that has made voters increasingly invested in politics and 
parties. But it has also provided grist for political polarisation, particularly in 
heterogeneous societies such as India. Given this scenario, foreign policy obser­
vers should prepare for a more politicised and domestically contested conducting 
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Social Media in Indian Elections: From 2014 to 2019
India’s 2014 general election saw the country’s highest-ever voter turnout, with 554 
million people exercising their mandate to elect the 16th Lok Sabha (Lower house 
of the Indian Parliament). Strong anti-incumbency sentiment had been fuelled by 
allegations of corruption and policy paralysis levelled against the united Progres-
sive Alliance (uPA) government led by the Indian National Congress (INC). India’s 
young population, about 65 per cent of whom are below the age of 35, was especially 
eager for change. The 2014 election was also the first where social media users were 
taken seriously as voters by political parties, who used frontline technology and in-
novative ideas for voter outreach. For the first time, leading Indian advertisement 
agencies, public relations firms, social media analytics and marketing companies, 
citizen volunteer groups, non-resident Indians, and offline campaigners came to-
gether to promote the political party of their choice. Cresting on the wave of an anti-
corruption movement led by activist Anna hazare, starting in 2011, social  media 
emerged as a key barometer of public opinion. Those political parties that lever-
aged social networking sites (SNS) to respond to their supporters turned out to be 
the most successful in electoral terms, as illustrated by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) securing an unprecedented 282 out of 545 seats in the current parliament. 
Five years later, social media has established itself as the major communication 
platform for India’s political parties. Youth participation in political discourses via 
SNS has increased. India today accounts for more than 300 million smartphone 
 users, and its 200 million-plus WhatsApp users forward the most content world-
wide (Times of India 2018). Social media effectively connects with one-third of In-
dian voters. If the 2011 Census data is extrapolated to the upcoming 2019 election, 
there could be 130 million first-time voters – most of them social media users. This 
electorate is currently being targeted aggressively by political parties, who hope 
these first-time voters become lifelong supporters. 
however, the democratisation of social media as a political communication 
platform in India has not meant its professionalisation as an information-sharing 
one. unimpeded by the gatekeeping function of traditional media for content ac-
curacy and ethics of responsible reporting, political parties are using social media 
for a divisive campaign of religious and caste politics. For instance, a report by the 
Oxford Internet Institute identified India as one of the 10 major countries of organ-
ised social media manipulation (Bradshaw and howard 2018). The Indian news 
channel NDTV mined hate speech and “dog-whistling” content (coded messages 
pandering to caste and religious biases), and found that divisive rhetoric by senior 
politicians had increased almost 500 per cent over the last four years (Jaishwal, 
Jain, and Singh 2018). The observer research Foundation, meanwhile, mapped 
hate speech on social media and found religio-cultural practices to be the explicit 
basis for hate comments mostly aimed at the Muslim community (Mirchandani 
2018). Whereas opposition parties accuse the BJP of religious polarisation to shift 
attention from the country’s flagging economy, the INC has responded with its own 
campaign of fear and anger. As a consequence, the increase in polarising content 
within the social media campaigns of India’s major political parties has emerged as 
a defining characteristic of the 2019 electoral contest. 
Based on illustrations of both major Indian parties’ use of social media, this 
contribution assesses the impact that a fast-changing media environment is having 
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on India’s elections. Comparing the BJP’s and the INC’s social media campaigns, we 
detail how the medium affects the message – thereby deepening societal fault lines. 
Moreover, we argue that social media’s polarising effects will eventually affect the 
conducting of Indian foreign policy too. observers should therefore monitor social 
media debates closely and prepare for a more politicised domestic one around In-
dian foreign affairs.
The BJP’s 2019 Social Media Campaign
In 2014, the BJP’s goal was to transform the image of its star campaigner Narendra 
Modi from a right-wing politician to the people’s leader with a decisive development 
agenda. Modi had used the previous decade as chief minister of Gujarat to showcase 
his state as a model of growth and promised to “reform, perform, transform” the 
country. Nationally, a social media blitz was unleashed for an image makeover of 
the BJP and Modi, where their hindutva (a political ideology that views India as 
a land of hindus and understands hinduism primarily as a cultural construct in 
opposition to Western, secular values) image was airbrushed. however, in states 
where the average voter was more responsive to religious or caste appeals, Modi 
was portrayed as the alpha male hindu leader – or as a chai wallah (“tea seller”) 
who identified with the backward castes (Ullekh 2015). This religious image was 
underplayed on social media, however, where the target audience was mostly urban 
professionals more invested in the economy than identity politics. 
The unfolding 2019 campaign has further developed the BJP’s targeting strat-
egy via the systematic use of WhatsApp groups, though with one distinctive differ-
ence from the 2014 campaign: posts have become more polarising, as evident from 
the BJP’s state election campaigns in Gujarat (2017), uttar Pradesh (2017), Karna-
taka (2018), and rajasthan (2018). The content of their posts has been increasingly 
informed by the hindu nationalist vision of their parent organisation, the rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (rSS) – the world’s largest national volunteer organisation, 
whose stated goal is to transform India into a Hindu Rashtra (“hindu state”). 
Today, the BJP’s social media strategy forks in two directions: the positive cam-
paign messaging of Modi, and the ideological/religious polarisation and opposition 
suppression tactics of the BJP’s information technology cell. In Modi’s optimistic 
messages he projects himself as the benign patriarch who speaks for all Indians, 
while still maintaining his hindutva beliefs. This is evidenced by his noticeable si-
lence on violent crimes against religious minorities and Dalits (castes who have 
been traditionally subjected to untouchability) and his attacks on press freedom. 
This coupling of digital and populist politics marks a major trait of the 2019 
election: its move towards an app-based election, primarily the Narendra Modi 
(NaMo) app and WhatsApp. The NaMo app typifies Modi’s governing style of di-
rectly calling on the people to participate in government policies and to sign up as 
volunteers for his programmes (Figure 1 below). Among other things, it includes 
a “To-Do” list for citizens, an infographics section on the government’s achieve-
ments, a “Know the Man” section about Modi, and streams of Maan ki Baat (Modi’s 
monthly radio talk). The more people participate in it, the more “citizenship points” 
they rake in – making individuals personally invested in Modi and the BJP. The 
party’s polling booth workers have been instructed to use the NaMo app to con-
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nect with voters, and the app is also used for opinion polls and to gain feedback on 
national and local issues as well as the performance of politicians. The downside of 
the app is that any user can post content of any kind to it, making it susceptible to 
helping spread fake news and polarising messages (Bansal 2019).
The party’s social media strategy is decided by their “War room,” comprised of core 
BJP members and headed by party president Amit Shah. Currently, their IT cell 
has 100–150 people on its payroll and around 1.2 million volunteers working for 
it (ullekh and Shah 2018). Their state units promote a hindu nationalist identity 
alongside the party’s development agenda. This allows the BJP to employ religion 
expediently, while still presenting a national image that is more inclusive. Like re-
ligion, patriotism is used to conscript supporters and identify opponents – often 
branded as “anti-nationals.” This is mostly carried out by the “troll army” of men 
and women espousing hyper-nationalist and Islamophobic views. Their abuse of-
fensive has been scaled up systematically since 2014 against journalists, academics, 
and critics of the BJP and the rSS. In 2016, an India Today investigation revealed 
how IT companies like WebAppMate and VibgyorTechnosystems sold services to 
political parties specifically for spreading malice and creating religious polarisa-
tion. Such companies doctor facts, create fake videos, and spread these through 
proxy servers located overseas as part of smear campaigns (Figure 2 below).
Trolls and bots (scripts that run automated tasks on the Internet and are taken 
to be human “followers” that assure “Likes”) are used to manufacture political con-
sent. Some Twitter trolls were also part of the Super 150, a group of social media 
influencers hosted by Modi at his official residence in 2015. Digital campaigning 
has taken a pernicious form with bulk WhatsApp forwards too. As Ankit Lal, the 
social media coordinator of the Aam Aadmi Party, an opposition party, puts it: 
“We wrestle on Twitter. The battle is on Facebook. The war is on WhatsApp” (Goel 
2018). During the 2018 Karnataka state election, the BJP state unit created 23,000 
WhatsApp groups – each with 80–100 members – for hyper-local (location- and 
community-specific) messaging (Ullekh and Shah 2018). Such groups engage in 
name-calling, memetic warfare (using memes to ridicule and discredit opponents), 
hashtag warfare (pinpointing the enemy by mobilising supporters around an issue 
Figure 1 
The Narendra Modi 
App
Source: BJP.org 2018.
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and making it trend on social media), disinformation, biased reporting, invoking 
the dominant religion, and countering any criticism of the BJP with whataboutery 
(making unrelated counter-accusations to deflect criticism). 
Arguably, WhatsApp has emerged as the weapon of choice for the 2019 election – 
as it can reach voters in locations where other platforms cannot. While it has been 
used for sharing relevant information by political parties, it can also rapidly spread 
disinformation. Its encryption code makes it difficult to locate the source of mis-
chievous posts. Mob lynching by cow vigilante groups (beef is banned in India in 
deference to hindu sentiment) can be instanced here (Subramanya 2017). The In-
dian news website, The Quint, has documented this religiously motivated phenom-
enon under its “When WhatsApp rumours Kill” section. There is no evidence of the 
BJP’s complicity in these lynchings, but examples of high-ranking party members 
supporting cow protectors suggest, at least, tacit approval. 
The BJP, through rallies and SNS, has started a massive social media volunteer 
recruitment drive under the Mera Booth Sabse Mazboot (“my worker at the polling 
booth is the strongest”; Figure 3 below) hashtag campaign. This is directly linked 
with their new WhatsApp strategy for the 2019 election. A key role is played by a 
mobile phone pramukh (“main worker”), with one for each of the country’s 927,533 
polling booths. 
Figure 2 
Fake Quote Attributed 
to Indian Journalist 
Rana Ayyub, Who has 




P. M. Modi’s Inter-
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In rajasthan, during a meeting with such booth-level workers, Amit Shah de-
nounced rahul Gandhi’s followers as “goons” and “foreigners” and exhorted the 
crowd to make the BJP’s messages – real or fake – go viral (The Wire 2018) – a 
volte-face from his July 2018 injunction against posting fake news. Shah claimed to 
have a 3.2 million-member WhatsApp group in uttar Pradesh to whom messages 
were sent every morning. How such messages influence social media warriors can 
be gleaned from the example of Pranav Bhat, a BJP youth leader in Karnataka. he 
was quoted in an article in the New York Times saying that he used WhatsApp to 
communicate constantly with the 60 voters that he had been assigned to track for 
the BJP prior to the state election. he shared dire warnings about hindus being 
butchered by Muslims, including a debunked BJP claim of 23 activists being killed 
by Muslim jihadis. Also shared were propagandist news stories, including a fake 
poll (allegedly by the BBC) predicting a clean sweep for the BJP in the Karnataka 
election (Goel 2018). 
The INC’s 2019 Social Media Campaign
A latecomer to the field of social media campaigning, the INC has stepped up its 
online communications since May 2017. In social and economic terms, the INC is a 
centre-left party, avowedly secular, and prone to virtue-signalling terms like “inclu-
sive” and “unity in diversity.” This is to contrast them with the BJP, who are viewed 
as divisive. Yet the INC’s social media posts have, in recent times, projected what 
some have called “soft hindutva” politics. This harking back to their 1980s’ practice 
of right-leaning populism is widely seen as a response to the BJP’s criticism of the 
INC being a pro-Muslim party. From 2017 onwards, their media posts have, among 
other things, highlighted rahul Gandhi’s frequent visits to hindu temples (Figure 4 
below), his announcement of wearing janeu (the “sacred thread” of Brahmins), call-
ing himself a Shiv Bhakt (“devotee of the hindu God, Shiva”), and invoking hindu 
deities during public speeches. All this took place in BJP-ruled states, which have a 
hindu majority that went to the polls in 2018. 
Figure 4 
Rahul Gandhi Offer-
ing Prayers at the 
Mahakaleshwar Tem-
ple, Devoted to Lord 
Shiva, at the Start of 
His Tour in the Poll-
Bound Malwa-Nimar 
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Gandhi’s social media posts assert his hindu identity without demonising Muslims, 
but also make them “invisible” from his campaigns – quite unlike his grandmother 
Indira Gandhi, who used to go temple-hopping before elections in the 1970s and 
early 1980s while also reaching out to Muslim and Christian voters. In 2014, the 
INC’s social media posts played up the fear of a “communal party” (i.e. one mobilis-
ing against a particular religious group – in this case, Muslims) coming to power – 
but failed to provide a clear alternative. Now there is no such ambiguity. The INC’s 
social media wing has adopted the BJP’s tactics of focusing on a star campaigner, 
rahul Gandhi, projecting his hindu identity, and denouncing the BJP as a “pro-cor-
porate, anti-people” government. Modi’s gibe about the INC-led uPA government 
being suit boot ki sarkar (“a suited and booted government for the rich”) in 2014 is 
now being used against him; for instance, the INC’s posts constantly highlight the 
fact that the BJP is the largest beneficiary of corporate funding (Pradhan, Chaud-
hary, and roy Chowdhury 2018; Figure 5 below). 
Straitened funds directly impact the INC’s social media clout. While the party has 
curbed expenses and aggressively sought crowdfunding on its SNS (Talukdar 2018), 
it is still behind the BJP in online campaigning for the 2019 election. A revamped 
social media cell spearheaded by the young actor-turned-politician Divya Spandana 
plays a vital part in the INC’s campaigning. Spandana, who had a massive Twitter 
following and was known for her anti-BJP posts, was handpicked by Gandhi in 2017 
to ensure a massive uptick in the INC’s social media followers (Bharadwaj and Kha-
jane 2018). her team managed to convert the convention-bound leaders of the INC 
into active social media participants, and popularised the social media handles of 
Rahul Gandhi (@OfficeOfRG/@RahulGandhi) and the INC (@INCIndia) in terms 
of visibility, followers, and audience engagement. Like the BJP, they are supported 
by state units – though of smaller scale – and plan to hire 90,000 cyber warriors to 
help booth-level campaigns (ullekh and Shah 2018). 
In tone and tactics, the INC’s social media campaigns are not that different 
from the BJP’s. Their provocative, witty, and abusive posts mirror the BJP’s propa-
ganda styles of using glittering generalities (emotionally appealing phrases, ones 
associated with noble values but not substantiated with facts), name-calling, and 
“bandwagoning” (influencing people to think/act in a certain way because others 
are already doing the same). This has made their posts highly shareable. Infograph-
Figure 5 
The INC’s Cartoons 
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ics criticise the government’s policies through simplified messages, using a pro- 
and anti-people binary. Their hashtags and memes are deployed with humour (for 
instance, caricaturising Modi’s awkward hugs with world leaders as “hugplomacy”) 
and abuse. Their attack was amped up with derisive coinages like “jumla party” 
(“party of platitudes”) used against the BJP and ad hominem attacks against Modi 
like “TravelAgentModi” – using Modi’s frequent foreign trips, often in the company 
of a select group of entrepreneurs, to accuse him of allowing scandal-ridden busi-
nesspersons to escape the legal dragnet.
Another tactic is using BJP’s slogans against them. For example, playing on 
phonetics to make a point about Modi being economical with the truth, the BJP’s 
Swachh Bharat (“Clean India”) slogan is annexed and transformed into Sach 
Bharat (“Truthful India”) – which is, no less, the INC’s banner image on Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube (Figure 6 below). 
In the creative and competitive trolling space of the Internet, the BJP has made 
derogatory terms like Pappu (“stupid”) for Gandhi and “libtard” (retarded liberal), 
“sickular” (sick and secular), “presstitute” (paid media), “porkie” (Muslim), and 
“anti-nationals” for INC and AAP supporters a part of the online political lexicon 
(Figure 7 below). Conversely, INC trolls disparage Modi as Feku (“bluffing brag-
gart”) and BJP supporters as bhakts (“blind believers”). 
Like Modi’s talks, Gandhi’s speeches are streamed through the “rG Speaks” section 
of the INC’s website, which is linked with their social media pages. This helps build 
up the positive profile of their star campaigner. On the other hand, criticism-filled 
Figure 6 
The Cover Image of 
the INC’s Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube 
Pages, Portraying the 
INC to be the Rep-
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press briefings by the INC spokespersons on the BJP and National Democratic Alli-
ance government are live telecast via SNS and promoted by their Twitter handle and 
party website. To undermine Modi’s claim of spurring growth through incorrupt-
ible governance, the INC focus on the economic consequences of his government’s 
demonetisation and of the introduced goods and services tax policies. 
Apart from certain widely publicised lynchings by cow vigilante groups, as men-
tioned above, INC posts rarely highlight religiously sensitive issues. At the same 
time, they accuse the BJP of cultivating a climate of hate and fear, with their cam-
paigns of “hugNothate” (referring to Gandhi hugging Modi in parliament in 2018) 
and DaroMat (“Don’t Be Afraid”). The INC is also focused on WhatsApp campaign-
ing for the 2019 election, with initiatives like Project Shakti (“Strength”) helping to 
organise party workers on a common digital platform. Indeed, the December 2018 
state elections are the bellwether of an ideology-driven, hyper-local WhatsApp mes-
saging strategy aimed at engaging booth-level groups. 
Empowerment versus Populist Entrapment
In 2014 the BJP’s superior digital campaigning, in concert with a charismatic leader 
as well as pronounced anti-incumbency sentiment, proved crucial for the party’s 
electoral success. Since then, the INC, too, has invested in social media, building 
a more convincing image of its own candidate – and it may profit in the upcoming 
election from an array of hopes left unfulfilled by the Modi government. Given that 
the BJP’s positive messaging of “reform, perform, transform” has become less con-
vincing after five years in power, that party’s return to a more polarising campaign 
strategy is not surprising. hence, social media neither created hindu nationalists’ 
disdain for minorities nor is it the sole reason for the negativity of the currently 
unfolding campaign. 
Although political propaganda and persuasion tactics may be the same as 
before, social media has significantly increased their reach, brought in more ac-
tors, and sped up their pace of transmission. Among the social media platforms, 
WhatsApp is now the preferred political communication medium – allowing for the 
micro-targeting of voters to a novel degree. While a campaign message with a na-
tional focus can be sent through social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, 
WhatsApp can transmit personalised messages based on the hyper-segmentation of 
voters. Its “ecosystem strategy” – only known contacts can send messages – adds 
to its credibility.  
The turn to WhatsApp illustrates both the potentials and enormous challenges 
that the digitalisation of politics has brought about. WhatsApp reaches people even 
in the remotest parts of India in a way no other media format can at present. In the 
December 2018 state elections in India, WhatsApp substituted political roadshows 
in certain rural areas. With Internet speed set to further increase, this will bridge 
the rural–urban divide and intensify the rate of WhatsApp usage. one further con-
sequence is that, in contrast to 2014, the online battles of the 2019 election are 
increasingly being fought in local languages. As only 10 per cent of the Indian popu-
lation speaks English, WhatsApp offers content in local languages simultaneously 
with ShareChat and helo – two non-English-language platforms that have become 
increasingly popular. 
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While greatly expanding the participation of those traditionally excluded from 
politics, such hyper-local messaging might also aggravate existing social divisions. 
For instance, without fact checkers on the ground who know the local language, it 
is difficult to stem the tide of political propaganda and fake news that these plat-
forms have been used for. In fact, with 80 per cent of news being consumed via 
social media (Economic Times 2017) the relevance of traditional media formats has 
decreased rapidly. This makes monitoring social media for disinformation and hate 
speech and curbing malpractices of content creation and dissemination a pressing 
imperative – one that is more difficult to achieve in more scattered and inaccessible 
public spaces. 
Another looming challenge concerns the access to and use of personal data. In 
2018 Shivam Shankar Singh, a former BJP data analyst, revealed the process be-
hind this: the booth-wise profiling of voters is done by getting names from electoral 
rolls. They are then grouped by a party’s field agent according to religious/caste af-
filiation. Their telephone numbers can be acquired from freelance data vendors and 
their economic profile created by, for example, getting hold of their electricity bills. 
Apps and missed calls also help in collecting voters’ personal data. Messages are 
then tailored to the groups formed. While this may further diminish a shared public 
space for political debate, the political consequences of the ever-increasing value of 
individual voters’ data are now becoming visible. For instance, new voter induce-
ments – like rajasthan’s BJP Chief Minister Vasundhara raje’s plan to give smart-
phones to those who vote for her and Chhattisgarh’s BJP Chief Minister raman 
Singh doing the same – have emerged. Allegedly, contractors paid by the BJP then 
call voters for feedback on the provided device and mobile services, and ask them 
questions about their voting preferences – information to be used by party activists 
to target those who want to vote for the INC or to abstain (Goel and raj 2018).
What Lies Ahead?
The ramifications of all this for elections and democracy are immense. On the one 
hand, people have become increasingly invested in politics by being exposed to pol-
itical news daily through WhatsApp and preloaded SNS on smartphones. The 2014 
Indian general election demonstrated that digital campaigning may contribute to 
higher voter turnout. Moreover, social media’s emancipatory effects have come to 
the fore in India (as elsewhere). In october 2018, BJP Minister of State for External 
Affairs M. J. Akbar resigned after allegations of sexual assault by numerous women 
under the hashtag “MeToo” – a novelty for male-dominated Indian politics. on the 
other hand, there has been an increase in computational propaganda such as dis-
information, hate speech, and the creation of clickbait content – leading to echo 
chambers and filter bubbles that can worsen existing social divisions. 
In the lead-up to the 2019 election campaign, BJP and INC social media com-
munications have widened societal fault lines. The 2018 elections in Karnataka, 
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, rajasthan, and Telangana lend weight to this 
perception: in these states, the two parties created local WhatsApp groups, “Like 
farms,” and troll armies, converting the Internet into a highly polarised sphere of 
political debate. Social media, with its personalised frames and interactive user ex-
perience, encourages a style of politics that is more combative – where the impres-
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sion of straight talk by the leader is created by jettisoning conventional niceties, 
as long as it confirms the biases of the target audience. Social media thus favours 
populist communication – “us versus them” and “good versus evil” rhetoric – by all 
parties. The messaging format is also important, as such platforms allow for easy 
sharing of audiovisual content. In the 2019 election campaign, even more videos 
might be shared by Indian political parties – as the country’s population spent some 
47 billion hours on the top five streaming apps in 2018 (Mehta 2019). Through tech-
niques like “deepfake” (an artificial, image-based human face synthesis method), 
videos can be doctored easily. With political parties having cyber warriors for each 
polling booth circulating more videos and messages with political and psychologi-
cal appeal, especially during charged times, this may create further grounds for 
polarisation.
While the news industry and politics are still grappling with the consequences 
of now-digitalised election campaigns, foreign observers should prepare for more 
polarised, divisive contests going forward. Even though in the case of India, with 
its tradition of bipartisan consensus on major foreign policy issues, New Delhi’s 
foreign relations appear to have been less affected by social media-driven polarisa-
tion so far, there is little to suggest that this will remain the case forever. In fact, 
in a globalised world, foreign policy issues that resonate with the core fault lines 
in heterogeneous societies abound. From the India–Pakistan stalemate, which has 
been attributed in part to growing politicisation ahead of India’s general election, 
to New Delhi’s refusal to even acknowledge the rohingya refugee crisis unfolding in 
neighbouring Myanmar and Bangladesh until late in 2017, indications are that so-
cial media-driven polarisation does indeed come to affect the conducting of foreign 
affairs. In many cases, such highly charged domestic contestation may effectively 
hamper international compromises being reached. 
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